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Abstract: There is agreement neither concerning the point that is being 
made in Posterior analytics 96b15-25 nor the issue Aristotle intends to 
address. There are two major lines of interpretation of this passage. 
According to one, sketched by Themistius and developed by Philoponus and 
Eustratius, Aristotle is primarily concerned with determining the definitions of 
the infimae species that fall under a certain genus. They understand Aristotle 
as arguing that this requires collating definitional predictions, seeing which 
are common to which species. Pacius, on the other hand, takes Aristotle to be 
saying that a genus is studied scientifically through first determining the 
infimae species that fall under that genus. This interpretation attributes to 
Aristotle a distinction between primary and derivative subjects. I argue for 
Pacius's interpretation, defending it against Barnes's objections.  
 
1. Introduction  
Like much of the philosophy of science presented in the 
Posterior analytics, APo. 2.13 96b15-25 is concise to the point of near 
unintelligibility. There is agreement neither concerning the point that 
Aristotle is making nor the issues that he intends to address.1 There 
are two reasons why the passage is so obscure. First, as in much of 
the APo., Aristotle uses technical language. But the terms that he uses 
have multiple senses, and there are not enough clues to clearly 
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determine which sense any of them have. Second, the passage 
appears to be out of context. Again this is not unusual for the APo., 
much of which appears to be a sheaf of unrelated notes. But because 
the passage is so difficult, commentators have strained to find ways to 
link the passage to what is discussed in what precedes and follows: 
the hunt for definitions. As we shall see, what results is a family of 
interpretations that are endorsed by most commentators. I believe 
that these are mistaken. In the present paper I show why this is so, 
how the passage is to be interpreted, and why this is important.  
I shall argue that most commentators are wrong in taking the 
passage to concern the use of the method of division to determine the 
definitions of the infimae species falling under a genus. Rather, Ross is 
correct in taking the passage to lay out the explanatory relations that 
hold among the definitions of simple subjects and those predicates 
that are demonstrated to hold of composite subjects, built out of the 
simple ones.2 In Goldin (1996) I have argued at length that the 
clarification of the relations between simple subjects, composite 
subjects, and their kath' hauta sumbebēkota (demonstrable attributes) 
is a main theme of APo. 2.8-10. I have shown how Aristotle there 
distinguishes between simple subjects, which are the proper subject 
matter of the sciences, and derivative subjects, which are identified 
with the demonstrated attributes, which are studied by determining 
how they follow from the definitions of the simple subjects. I believe 
that the same point is being made here. The passage confirms the 
interpretation I have put forward of 2.8-10.  
I begin by presenting an interpretation-free translation, and 
indicating the terminological ambiguities on which a choice of 
interpretation must rest. I then take up each of these points in turn, 
and argue for my interpretation. I then review without supporting 
argument what I take to be the gist of 2.8-10, and show how Aristotle 
is making much the same point here. I conclude with both a full 
translation and a paraphrase, which show how the text is to be 
understood.  
 
2.  
APo. 2.13 96b15-25 is as follows:  
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The following translation steers clear of commitment on any 
controversial point, and as such is unintelligible:  
 
When someone is dealing with a certain whole, one must divide 
the genus into the primary things that are atomic in kind. For 
example, one must divide number into triad and dyad, and then 
in this way one must try to get the definitions of them. For 
example, one must try to get the definitions of straight line, 
circle, and of right angle. After this, when one has got what the 
genus is, whether, for example, it is among the quantities or 
qualities, one must study the proper attributes through the 
things that are primary and common. For the predicates of the 
complexes put together from the atoms will be clear from the 
definitions, on account of the fact that definition and the simple 
is the principle of all things and on account of the fact that the 
predicates belong in themselves to the simples alone, and to the 
other things on account of them. 
There are four issues preliminary to determining the general sense of 
the passage:  
 
1. What does it mean to divide the kind under consideration into 
the primary things atomic in kind?  
2. What are the proper attributes?  
3. What are the things that are primary and common?  
4. What are the predicates that belong in themselves?  
 
3.  
1) What does Aristotle mean when he tells us that, when dealing 
with some whole, one must divide the kind under consideration into 
the primary things atomic in kind?  
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However we interpret the details of the passage, Aristotle is 
discussing how to ‘get definitions’ and ‘study attributes’. Definitions 
are the principles of demonstration. Hence at least part of what 
Aristotle is discussing is the securing of the principles of 
demonstration. Throughout the APo., Aristotle has stressed that 
different sciences deal with different kinds of things, and that for each 
kind of thing there is a different set of first principles.3 We note that 
Aristotle tells us that his comments pertain to when ‘someone is 
dealing with a certain whole’. The ‘whole’ which is relevant in the 
process of securing first principles is either the genus with which a 
certain science is concerned, or, less plausibly, the body of facts, 
observations, and insights that are to be systematically ordered by 
means of this science. Nothing philosophical hinges on this 
interpretation of ‘whole’, since Aristotle takes the identity of a single 
science to be determined by the single genus with which that science 
is concerned. To deal with the whole set of not-yet-ordered facts which 
concern a single science is to deal with the genus which is that 
science’s subject matter.  
It is in this context that one must concern oneself with the 
‘primary things atomic in kind’ (eidos). Although eidos can in isolation 
refer to a genus at a any level of universality, when used in proximity 
to genos, it refers to a kind falling under some other kind, which is 
referred to as a genos (Balme, 1962). So here, the kinds in regard to 
which we identify the primary atoms are species falling under the 
genus that determines the scope of the scientific inquiry at hand.  
Concerning these primary entities, we are told: 1) They are 
atomic, that is, indivisible.4 This means that they are without discrete 
parts that exist as such apart from one another. 2) They are the 
foundation for the study of the ‘proper attributes’. 3) Complexes are 
built up from them. We are told that these same complexes are 
studied on the basis of certain definitions. When Aristotle says that 
‘the definition and the simple is the principle of all things’ he is 
possibly identifying definitions and simples (where ‘definition’ must be 
understood as what is identified in those linguistic entities that are 
principles of demonstration and are also called definitions).5 Though 
much is yet unclear, we can see the Aristotle wants to identify the 
simples and the atoms, and also those entities whose definitions are 
the first principles on the basis of which certain facts about ‘complexes’ 
are somehow built up from the simples.  
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The distinction between atoms and things compounded of them 
reminds us of 1.28 87a38-39: ‘A single science is one pertaining to a 
single genus-all of those things that are compounded of the primary 
things and are kath’ hauta parts or attributes of these’.6 Here, to be 
sure, Aristotle identifies the genus of a science with compounds and 
attributes, not simples or the subjects of attributes. But other 
passages of the APo. clearly distinguish the genus with which a science 
deals and the attributes of the genus that are made intelligible by 
virtue of that science (1.7 75a32-b3, 1.10 76b11-16, 21-22). We can 
forgive Aristotle the compression of language here which does not 
make clear the relation between the genus, the complexes, and the 
attributes. 87a38-39 is important because of its distinction between 
simple subjects on the one hand and complex subjects and attributes, 
on the other. We can at least tentatively identify these complex 
entities and the kath’ hauta parts or attributes of the simple entities. 
But on account of the exceeding concision of his language it is still 
unclear as to exactly what sort of entities Aristotle is referring. What 
are the simples? What are the complexes and attributes?  
Two general ways of answering this question have emerged in 
the tradition of Posterior analytics scholarship. Each interprets ‘primary 
things that are atomic in kind’ in a different manner. The dative 
 can be taken to modify  or That is to say, 
the ‘primary things that are atomic in kind’ can be a) those kinds that, 
among all of the kinds that are not such as can be further divided and 
split, are primary; or b) indivisible items which are to be ranked first 
among all of those items that are grouped or regarded in respect to 
some kind.  
 
a) The simplest way of understanding ‘the primary things that are 
atomic in kind’ is to take them as referring to species that are 
unsplittable insofar as they cannot be subdivided into any more 
particular species. On this reading, the passage in question begins 
with the sensible suggestion that the first step in developing a 
science dealing with some genus is to determine the infimae 
species falling under that genus. But there are problems with this 
interpretation. It ill fits the examples that Aristotle gives. Perhaps 
‘straight line’, ‘circle’, and ‘right angle’ can plausibly be take to be 
among a determinate number of basic kinds in geometry. But could 
Aristotle be exhorting us to list and clarify individual numbers as 
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the basic kinds of arithmetic? The list would go well beyond 
Aristotle’s examples of two and three; there would be an infinite 
number of such numbers, all of which would need to be 
distinguished through the process of division, prior to scientific 
clarification of the genus number. In order to avoid this result, one 
must say that according to Aristotle’s arithmetic theory, all 
numbers derive from the numbers two and three, in such a manner 
that all arithmetical proofs are ultimately grounded in the 
definitions of these numbers as first principles. This is the 
suggestion of Pacius.7 Predictably, the details remain murky, but 
that does-not speak against its credentials as an authentically 
Aristotelian teaching, since in principle the science of numbers 
cannot be formalized according to the structures laid down in the 
Posterior analytics.8  
b) An alternative would be to take the atoms here not to be the basic 
kinds, but the basic terms that are employed in defining the kinds. 
Such terms would be unsplittable insofar as they are not defined on 
the basis of more basic terms. They are primary insofar as they are 
underived; on this account, then, ‘primary’ and ‘atomic’ are here 
synonymous. On this interpretation, many terms are composites, 
and to define such a term is to analyze it in an account of the 
simple or atomic elements that make it up. This distinction between 
atoms and complexes corresponds to our distinction between 
primitive and derived terms.  
 
This is the line of interpretation favored by Barnes. He 
recognizes that at 96b16 ‘atom’ must refer to an infima species, but 
argues that it cannot have this sense at 96b21. ‘For it is hard to refer 
“the items compounded from the atoms” to the higher genera; it is 
impossible to suppose that attributes “hold of the other things in virtue 
of” their holding of an infima species’.9 The first objection, however, 
presupposes that what is compounded from the atoms are genera; 
that the sort of composition here is simply adding together the 
extensions of the species. I shall advocate both an alternative account 
of the nature of the composition of the atoms, and shall argue that 
according to Aristotle’s theory it is indeed the case that the attributes 
of complex subjects are caused by, and are to be explained by, the 
natures of the simple subjects.  
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What positive arguments favor Barnes's interpretation? Does the 
Posterior analytics contain other indications of the distinction between 
primitive and derived terms? Barnes points to 1.10 76a32 and 1.28 
87a38-39. In the first passage Aristotle says that of the things treated 
by a given science, the primary things and those from them have their 
ti sēmainei (what it means) assumed, and that while the being of the 
primary things is assumed, it is proven for the others. In the second 
passage, Aristotle identifies the in itself parts or attributes of a kind as 
what comes from certain primitives. Here, as at 1.1 71a17-25, 
Aristotle speaks of how a science assigns certain explanatory roles to 
both the being and the meaning of a certain item. It is linguistic 
entities, terms, that have meaning, and extralinguistic entities that, in 
the context of the sciences, are said to have being. Hence, as is 
sometimes the case in the Organon, there is no way to avoid 
attributing to Aristotle a use/mention confusion.10 This can be 
disentangled, but doing so is not straightforward. At issue is whether 
we are to take Aristotle as sloppily distinguishing between two kinds of 
linguistic entities (so that primitive terms denote those beings whose 
existence is assumed and derived terms denote those beings whose 
existence is demonstrated), or two kinds of entities, basic and 
derivative subjects, the second of which are not defined through the 
first principles of a science, although the meaning of terms referring to 
them is laid out in a nominal definition. If we interpret Aristotle as 
making the first distinction, we attribute to him a kind of linguistic 
foundationalism, according to which certain meanings are basic and 
others built up from them, as laid out in the definitions of those other 
terms. Aristotle nowhere clearly advocates such a linguistic 
foundationalism, and his later writings, at any rate, are incompatible 
with it. In Meta. Z.12 1038a18-25 Aristotle tells us that a differentia 
refers to the same simple as the whole definition, insofar as the 
differentia already implies the genus under which it falls. Hence the 
meaning of the species term is not simply a conjunction of the 
meanings of the terms present in its definition. For these reasons, I 
take note of this possible interpretation of ‘atoms’ but do not pursue it 
further. Instead, I endorse the second interpretation, according to 
which Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of beings: simples, of 
which a science assumes both the essence and being, and complex 
entities, of which a science assumes a nominal definition of the term 
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that refers to them and demonstrates the existence. As I discuss 
below, this distinction is central to the APo., as I understand it.  
2) At 96b20 Aristotle tells us that once one has divided the 
genus into simples, defined the simples (which will among other things 
involve determining the category to which their genera belong)11 and 
determined the genus to which a certain kind belongs, one must study 
the proper pathē on the basis of ‘the things that are primary and 
common’. What does Aristotle mean by the ‘proper attributes’? What is 
the sense of pathē here? Since Aristotle is dealing with the kinds of 
things considered by a science, and science deals with timeless and 
eternal relations and predication, pathē cannot here have its non-
technical sense of what something undergoes or experiences. It 
therefore has the more general sense of ‘attributes’. Aristotle is 
discussing how to scientifically study certain attributes of the subjects 
of the sciences. But Aristotle carefully distinguishes two different sorts 
of such attributes. Does Aristotle have in mind a) the demonstrated 
attributes, the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota (APo., 1.7 75a42-b2, Meta. 
Δ.30 1025a30-32)? Or b) is he discussing the definitional attributes of 
a subject? These are dealt with in very different ways by the science 
that studies them. Those attributes which Aristotle sometimes calls the 
kath’ hauta sumbebēkota are demonstrated. Attributes which are 
included in a thing’s essence and are expressed in definitions are 
grasped through noēsis. 
As Ross points out,12 it would be very odd for Aristotle to use 
pathē to refer to definitional attributes. Rather, within the Posterior 
analytics he uses the term to refer to the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota 
(1.7 75a42-b2, 1.9 76a12-13, 1.10 76b15-16); this strongly suggests 
that 2a is the correct alternative. But this has been the minority view, 
probably because of the difficulty in developing on its basis a cogent 
interpretation of the paragraph as a whole. Many commentators have 
found 2b to be more promising, and they read this line as part of 
Aristotle’s general account of how to secure the definition of a species 
through collecting and organizing a set of definitional attributes. 
3) What are the primary, common things that are the basis of a 
science’s consideration of the aforementioned pathē? Four main 
alternatives present themselves. 
a) The most natural sense of prōta is ‘first’ in the sense 
introduced at 1.2 71 b21: most basic in the order of both 
causation and explanation. At least part of what Aristotle is 
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saying would be the familiar point that a scientific account of 
a certain feature of reality must rest on first principles, 
concerning which there can be no similar account. But then 
what does Aristotle mean in referring to common first 
principles? Aristotle elsewhere (1.10 76b14-15, 1.32 88a36-
38) calls those principles ‘common’ which apply to subjects 
falling under more than one genus. He has in mind both 
principles which apply to all beings, no matter what the 
genus (such as logical principles, cf. 1.1 71a13-14) and 
premises which apply across genera, but not to all beings (as 
the laws of proportion apply to both numbers and 
magnitudes, but not to other beings, such as raccoons or 
stones (1.10 76a37-b2). Aristotle sometimes (1.2 72a16-18, 
1.10 76b14) calls such principles ‘axioms’. They are 
indemonstrable, and as such are first principles.13 One 
problem is that it is very unclear why Aristotle would identify 
these, as opposed to other principles (such as the definitions 
of the species that form the subject matter of a science) as 
the principles that form the basis of a science’s investigation 
of the pathē. Waitz and Barnes speculate that Aristotle takes 
the axioms to have different instantiations, depending on the 
kind in question.14 So in saying that the investigation of the 
pathē on the basis of the axioms follows ascertaining the 
genus of the subject of the pathē, Aristotle is saying that one 
needs to determine which instantiation of an axiom is going 
to be operative, prior to its application. On this account, 
Aristotle is not neglecting the importance of other first 
principles; he is simply explaining that because common 
axioms are among the first principles that form the basis of 
one’s demonstrations, it is vital to determine exactly to what 
category one’s subject belongs, for otherwise a proper 
application of axioms would be impossible.15 In my view, 
however, this line of interpretation is voided by the sentence 
that follows (96b21-25), which stresses the central role of 
definition in demonstrations and is introduced by  , which 
indicates that what follows gives the reason for what 
precedes. It is not clear why the importance of definition as a 
first principle of demonstration sheds light on how it is that 
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within the context of scientific explanation a common axiom 
needs to be specified as applicable to a single subject.  
b) Hence we are led to seek an alternative interpretation, 
according to which ́ refers to first principles, but  has 
some other sense. Pacius provides such an interpretation: 
Aristotle is referring to certain premises employed in all of 
the demonstrations that belong to a certain science. But 
what are such premises? Every demonstrable proposition 
concerning a subject rests at least implicitly on the definition 
of that subject, and all subjects dealt with by a single science 
include in their definition the definition of the genus under 
which they fall. So there is a sense in which the definition of 
the genus that is the subject matter of a science is included 
in the premises of every demonstration falling under the 
science devoted to that genus. For example, the definition of 
‘animal’ would be at least implicit in every zoological 
demonstration. But Pacius takes another tack. He 
distinguishes between the primary and composite subjects 
considered by a certain science. The common, primary things 
are those principles that are common to the attributes of 
both primary and composite subjects.16 One who advocates 
this interpretation has the burden of proof to show that 
Aristotle did in fact distinguish subjects in this way.  
c) Earlier in 2.13 Aristotle has been discussing how one is able 
to attain precisely expressed definitions of kinds. Sense can 
be made of 96b15-25 in context. On this account, Aristotle 
imagines collecting all of the possible differentiate that fall 
under a certain genus to which a kind S belongs. One then 
sees which of these differentiae belong to the kind in 
question, and which hold of all members of higher genera. 
Accordingly, the common things to which Aristotle refers 
might be those attributes common to all of the kinds falling 
under the genus; this tells us that these will be present in 
the definition of that genus. But, as Barnes points out, on 
this interpretation it is again unclear what the sense of  
is.17  
d) At 96a32 Aristotle refers to the first point at which the 
differentia in question and its genera are coextensive with a 
kind in question. So in context with what precedes the term 
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would seem to refer to the specific attributes, not the generic 
ones. So one conceivable interpretation (though one that I 
have not seen advocated) is that the common primary things 
are the definitional attributes of the infimae species. To say 
that the pathē are investigated on their basis is to say that 
they are considered from the standpoint of the definitions of 
the infimae species. Hence on this interpretation Aristotle is 
making substantively the same point as in 3b, though the 
crucial terms are given a different sense. This interpretation, 
however, also fails explain the term  .  
 
4) Aristotle concludes the paragraph by telling us that the 
reason that the attributes of the complexes are made clear on the 
basis of definitions18 is that only simples are subjects for attributes 
that belong kath’ hauta; the things belong to subjects that are not 
simple do so by virtue of the subjects that are simple.  
What does Aristotle have in mind in referring to attributes which 
belong in themselves (kath’ hauta)?  
Kath’ hauto is a notoriously ambiguous technical term, to which 
Aristotle devotes several analyses. Of all of the many senses that 
Aristotle gives the phrase, only two seem possible candidates here. In 
both cases, if S is P kath’ hauto, P is predicated of S on account of 
(kata) what S itself is. A predicate is kath’ hauto i) infosar as it is 
caused or explained by the essence of its subject (1.473a34-7), or ii) 
it is kath’ hauto insofar as it is caused or explained by the essence of 
its subject (that is, it exists kata the subject), and hence can be 
demonstrated of it.19 The term I have thus far rendered ‘predicated’ is 
a participial form of sumbainein, a verb which is likewise ambiguous. 
Although Aristotle rarely uses this term in this sense, the verb with the 
dative can have the general sense of ‘the be an attribute of’, with no 
implications concerning the conceptual or logical relation between 
subject and predicate.20 According to this sense, there is no reason 
why a definitional predicate cannot be said to sumbainein kath’ hauto 
of its subject. On the other hand, ‘sumbainein’ in Aristotle often has 
the connotation of that which happens to befall something, that is, 
what is predicated in a manner which is not necessitated by the nature 
of the subject (what is not predicated kath’ hauto of the subject). Thus 
understood, ta sumbebēkota (the plural neuter perfect participle) is 
often rendered as ‘the accidents’. Hence, one of the senses of 
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‘accident’ is that which is not kath’ hauto, in sense i) above, that of 
being included in the definition of the subject (Apo. 1.473b4-5). 
Aristotle employs this sense of sumbebēkos when he employs the 
seemingly oxymoronic term kath’ hauta sumbebēkota to denote those 
attributes which are accidental in the sense of not inhering in the 
definition of the subject, but are kath’ hauta in the sense of following 
from the definition of the subject (Meta. Δ.30 1025b30-34). Although 
Aristotle commonly employs the perfect participial form kath’ hauta 
sumbebēkota as a technical locution, the present phrase ta 
sumbainonta kath’ hauta is very close, and, though Aristotle’s 
technical terminology does not require this, one could well take the 
two phrases to be synonymous.  
Accordingly, there are two major interpretations that can be 
given to ta sumbainonta kath’ hauta.  
 
a) Kath’ hauto can be given the sense of ‘definition’. If we take 
that option, sumbainein cannot have the sense of ‘to be 
predicated of accidentally’ for according to no sense of 
‘accidental’ is a definitional predicate accidental. On this 
understanding, Aristotle is referring to the attributes which 
enter into a definition of a term. Aristotle would be making 
the point that the terms which enter into definitions of 
complex terms are restricted to those which enter into the 
definitions of simple terms. This interpretation finds its 
strongest support in the fact that it gives to Aristotle a 
sensible conclusion to what precedes (given that we interpret 
pathē as definitional attributes) and that Aristotle proceeds 
to concern himself with collating and organizing the 
attributes which are present in the definitions of the kinds 
that are studied by a science (96b25-97b25).  
b) On the second interpretation too the pathē and ta 
sumbainonta kath’ hauta are taken to be the same thing, but 
here they are both taken to be demonstrable attributes, as 
opposed to definitional ones. The linguistic similarity between 
ta kath’ hauta sumbebēkota and ta sumbainonta kath’ hauta 
strongly suggests that Aristotle is saying that the 
demonstrated attributes that a science considers are 
primarily inherent in the simple subjects considered by a 
subject, and belong to other subjects via the intermediacy of 
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these simple subjects,21 On both interpretations, Aristotle is 
saying that, although we predicate such terms of complexes, 
they nonetheless exist not kata the complexes but kata the 
simples (the referent of ).  
 
To review, the major interpretative options are as follows:  
 
1. What does it mean to divide the kind under consideration into the 
primary atoms in respect to the kind?  
a. The systematization of a science requires dividing the genus 
treated by that science into its infimae species.  
 
b. b) The systematization of a science requires distinguishing 
between the primitive and derived terms employed in the 
technical discourse of that science.  
 
2. What are the proper attributes, which are studied through the 
things that are primary and common?  
a. They are the demonstrated attributes, the kath’ hauta 
sumbebēkota.  
b. They are the definitional attributes of the species that make 
up the subject matter of a science.  
3. What are the things that are primary and common, by means of 
which one studies the proper attributes?  
a. They are the common axioms, first principles shared by a 
number of sciences, but in the context of demonstration, 
instantiated in regard to the subject genus under 
consideration.  
b. They are those first principles that are ultimate premises for 
the demonstrations of the attributes of both the simple and 
the composite subjects of a science.  
c. They are the definitional attributes of the genus, which are 
common to all of the species that fall under the subject 
genus of a science.  
d. They are the definitional attributes of the infimae species that 
fall under a genus.  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 2004): pg. 707-727. DOI. This article is © Elsevier 
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
Elsevier. 
14 
 
4. What are the attributes that belong in themselves to the simples 
alone?  
a. They are the definitional attributes of the infimae species 
studied by the sciences.  
b. They are the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota of these species.  
 
4.  
An interpretation of this difficult passage must be assembled 
from these various options. It must meet the constraint of making one 
or more points consistent with the demonstrative theory sketched 
elsewhere in APo. Two more features of an interpretation would 
strengthen it. Aristotle ought to be making an interesting point, and 
the point ought to make some sense in its present context (though the 
Apo. is full of parenthetical notes that do not seem to be placed where 
they are for any clear reason).  
The following are the major interpretations in the literature.  
The interpretations of Philoponus,22 Themistius,23 Eustratius,24 
and Tricot25 rest on making the following exegetical choices: 1a, 2b, 
3c, 4a. On this account, Aristotle is here primarily concerned with 
determining the definitions of the infimae species that fall under a 
certain genus. This requires collating definitional predications, seeing 
which are common to which species. For Philoponus and Eustratius, 
the infima species is what is simple, and the genus is what is complex, 
insofar as the genus is an assemblage of all the species. In saying that 
the attributes of the complexes have as their basis the attributes of 
the simples, Aristotle is understood to be saying that the definition of 
the genus is arrived at through collecting and organizing the attributes 
common to all of the definitions of the species. Ross calls this 
interpretation that of ‘most of the commentators’.26 We have seen that 
he rejects this on account of the unlikely sense given to pathē, he also 
objects that Aristotle is unlikely to have considered the genus a 
complex in regard to the species, and that what follows (96b25-97b6) 
concerns the definition of species, not genera.  
Waitz opts for 1b, 2b, 3a, 4a.27 On this account, too, Aristotle is 
discussing the search for the definitions of the kinds falling under a 
genus. We begin by assembling the terms which enter into these 
definitions; these terms are the ‘simples’, 
while are the indivisible species. The definitions at which one arrives 
will be employed in demonstrations, with the aid of the common 
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axioms, understood as applicable to the kind at hand. These definitions 
are complexes which are studied on the basis of the simple terms that 
make them up.  
Pacius makes these choices: 1a, 2a, 3b, 4b. Ross mostly follows 
Pacius and chooses as follows: 1a, 2a, 3c, 4b. Aristotle on this account 
says that a genus is studied scientifically through first determining, the 
infimae species that fall under that genus. For it is on their basis, we 
are told, that we gain scientific understanding of the kath’ hauta 
sumbebēkota. This scientific understanding comes about through 
demonstration. On Pacius’s account, Aristotle explicitly identifies the 
principles concerned with a science’s primary subjects as forming the 
basis of these demonstrations. Ross tells us that these demonstrations 
will have as their basis ‘the primary attributes common to the primary 
and complex species’, 28 This shows that Ross opts for 3c, though it is 
unclear what Ross thinks Aristotle means by the primary attributes.  
Barnes expresses puzzlement with the passage. He sees 
advantages to both 1a and 1b. He takes 1b to be the most promising 
option at 96b21 but rejects it as ill suiting the examples of triad and 
dyad at 96b17. On the other hand, Barnes argues, if we identify ta 
koina prōta with the atoms, we are unable to give a good sense to 
96b19-21. Barnes likewise straddles the fence in regard to issue 3. He 
favors 2a and 4b, and despairs at putting all of these pieces together 
into a. single coherent interpretation.  
Detel opts for 1a, 2b, 3b, and 4b. Detel takes the passage to be 
part of the general discussion concerning division; hence he is led to 
take the pathē which are being investigated to be definitional 
attributes. He recognizes however that the end of the paragraph 
concerns the use of basic definition as first principles in demonstrating 
kath’ hauta predications. Consequently the philosophical point he takes 
the passage to be making is similar to that of Pacius. But he does not 
follow Pacius in taking the text to reflect a distinction between basic 
subjects and those ‘composed’ of them in any straightforward way. In 
Explaining an eclipse, I have argued that it is just such a distinction 
between simple and derivative subjects that enables Aristotle in 2.8-10 
to account for how the attributes and events most important to science 
are to be explained through strict syllogistic deduction from definitions. 
Below, I briefly sketch how this is so, and how I take this teaching to 
be reflected in the present passage. Detel on the other hand raises the 
problem of how non-definitional predications can be deduced 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 2004): pg. 707-727. DOI. This article is © Elsevier 
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
Elsevier. 
16 
 
syllogistically from definitions only to abandon it as insoluble. Rather, 
he takes the definitions and the divisions from which the definitions 
are derived to merely provide a background theory that provides the 
context from which these attributes and events can be accounted for 
in a looser, non-syllogistic manner. He takes the present passage to be 
pointing to the role indemonstrable predications play within such a 
background theory.29  
The interpretation that I advocate is similar to that of Pacius; I 
too opt for 1a, 2a, 3b, 4b. I precede my own account with a response 
to objections that are raised against an account such as that of Pacius.  
 
5.  
Among major commentators, Barnes alone has presented an 
argument against Pacius’s interpretation. He makes two points. The 
first misunderstands Pacius’s point; the second is successful against 
Pacius but not against my adaptation of Pacius’s account.  
Barnes first focuses on point 1a. As we have seen, for Pacius the 
atoms are those infimae species on the basis of which other kinds are 
built, as all of the other numbers are built up from the dyad and triad. 
Barnes’s objection does not focus on the murkiness of the 
mathematical details. Rather, he suggests that while, on Pacius’s 
account, Aristotle makes a point concerning the definitions of a specific 
variety of inifmae species (that which is the foundation of certain 
complexes), Aristotle ‘gives every appearance of making an entirely 
general point’.30 But Aristotle could still be construed as making a 
general point. The generality is not in regard to all of the subjects of a 
science, but in regard to all of the sciences. This is because, as I have 
suggested, all sciences are such as to admit the distinction between 
simple and derivative, composite subjects, since there is no real 
distinction between derivative subjects and demonstrable attributes.  
Barnes’s second objection is that Pacius’s interpretation has 
Aristotle making a patently false point-that the attributes of the 
compounds are attributes of the simples-that is, that 5 has the 
attributes of 2 and 3. This objection is especially effective if one takes 
Pacius to be attributing to Aristotle the view that any attribute of a 
composite subject must be an attribute of all of the simple subjects of 
which it is composed. But Pacius does not make such a strong point, 
nor is there support in the text for attributing it to Aristotle.31 Rather, 
Aristotle is most plausibly read as making the claim that every 
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attribute of a composite subject belongs to at least one of the simple 
subjects of which it is composed. Admittedly, this point does not hold 
in regard to Aristotle’s arithmetical example. It is not the case that 
every attribute of a number belongs to at least one of the simple 
numbers that make it up additively, though a stronger case can be 
make if the numbers that make up a complex number are its factors32 
(provided that the simples are not only 2 and 3 but all prime 
numbers).33 At any rate, here as elsewhere, the obscurity of the 
details of a mathematical example that Aristotle presents is not 
sufficient warrant for rejecting an account of how Aristotle’s account of 
scientific explanation squares with the mathematical details to which it 
is applied.  
But what could Aristotle mean by suggesting that any attribute 
of a complex subject is an attribute of at least one of the simple 
subjects involved? Does such a claim make sense in the context of 
Aristotle’s theory? This is the last issue to which I turn.  
 
6.  
I begin with what I take to be the Aristotle’s understanding of 
the distinction between simple and complex subjects studied by the 
sciences. I present this without supporting argument, for which I refer 
the reader to Explaining an eclipse.  
Aristotle takes the objects of scientific understanding to be 
propositional, that is, they are expressed in logoi in which one term is 
predicated of another. Scientific understanding of a proposition comes 
about through showing how it follows syllogistically from first 
principles. Among these are definitions, which express the essences of 
things. These essences are simple entities. Although a definition which 
expresses an essence is propositional in form (the genus and the 
differentia are attributes, and the definiendum is the subject), the 
subject and attributes all denote the same thing. (The genus points to 
basic features of the kind of which the thing belongs that are shared 
with things that belong to certain other kinds, but contra Plato neither 
the kind nor the features are things unto themselves.) Hence the 
subject is a simple, the definition of such a subject is a simple, and the 
noēsis by which one apprehends the subject in a scientific manner is 
correspondingly simple, however complex the process leading to that 
apprehension might be. Such subjects comprehend both infimae 
species and their genera (pace Philoponus and his followers); excluded 
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are derivative, complex subjects whose definitions are not assumed 
among the first principles of the sciences, although the meaning of the 
terms that denote them is assumed (1.1 71a12-16, 1.10 76a5-11).  
There are two ways in which a proposition can be demonstrated. 
First, the demonstrated attribute may be what I have called ‘implicitly 
definitional’, either present in the definition of a subject, or present in 
a definition which is present in the definition of a subject, and so on. 
The demonstration of such predications merely render explicit 
genus/species relations. They are a matter of a straightforward 
application of the syllogistic form Barbara, but there are few 
interesting propositions which can be so demonstrated.34 Second, 
Aristotle claims that one can show how certain features result from 
simple subjects standing in certain necessary relations with one 
another. To employ Aristotle’s own examples, in investigating thunder 
we consider the nature of fire as juxtaposed35 with that of cloud; when 
these stand in the appropriate relation, there is the quenching that 
leads to a certain noise that we identify with thunder, an identification 
that is expressed in a nominal definition of thunder. Likewise, in 
investigating an eclipse we determine the optical phenomenon that 
results when the moon, earth, and the sun’s light stand in certain 
periodically necessary relations. It can be scientifically shown that 
when these relations hold there results a certain kind of blockage of 
light from the moon which, again, is identified with an eclipse in a 
nominal definition (APo. 2.8 93a16-b14).  
There is a categorical distinction between the relation in which 
one subject stands in, regard to others, and an event or attribute that 
follows from it. Both a certain juxtaposition of moon, sun, and earth, 
on the one hand, and the blockage of light, on the other, stand in the 
category of relation. But from the point of view, not of metaphysics, 
but of the theory of demonstration, a juxtaposition or relation that 
constitutes a complex subject is merely a kind of attribute predicated 
of a simple subject. A demonstrated attribute such as thunder or 
eclipse may be referred to by a noun, and such a noun has a 
definition, in a sense, but one who has a scientific understanding of 
such an attribute recognizes that it is indeed an attribute, grasps the 
subject of which it is an attribute, and explains, on the basis of first 
principles, why it is an attribute of that subject. Thus the attribute of 
being eclipsed is the conjunction of certain perceptible, recognizable 
features that necessarily follow the attribute of standing in a certain 
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relation to other astronomical bodies. To turn to one of Aristotle’s 
biological examples (APo. 2.16 98b16-38), shedding is the attribute of 
having dead leaves fall from a plant’s living stalk, which necessarily 
follows the juxtaposition which, from the biological point of view, is the 
drying of sap at the juncture of the leaves and stalk and, from the 
point of view of chemistry, is the detachment of an earthy thing from 
another, elevated earthy thing.36 Aristotle takes this scheme to hold 
even in the mathematical realm; a certain feature of a side of a 
triangle (an attribute of a line) necessary follows from what we know 
about the triangle of which it is a side, and this triangle in turn is a 
juxtaposition of lines, which from another point of view can be 
considered as an attribute of a line on which it is constructed.37 So 
although, as we have seen, it is obscure how attributes of all numbers 
are to be understood as attributes of the simpler numbers, things are 
simpler in the case of Aristotle’s other examples. Shedding is properly 
speaking an attribute of earth, and eclipse, of the moon. To say that 
‘having the sum of the interior angles equal to two right angles’ is a 
predicate of a line is to say that every line is such that, when lines are 
drawn from its endpoints to some point outside the line, that line 
adjoins two angles that, when added to the angle that subtends that 
line, equal two right angles.38  
Except in logos (how we talk about it), such a juxtaposition is 
not a thing unto itself, apart from whatever predications result from it. 
Unlike the subjects which stand in relation to one another, it has no 
inner principle of unity. The fact that it occurs with necessity and with 
some regularity derives not from the nature of just one of the natures 
involved, but from all of them, in relation to each other. Accordingly, 
the world will be full of such periodically occurring complexes, 
juxtapositions, and relations, some eternal (for example, the sun, 
perpetually in orbit around the earth, entails that the sun always 
shines on the earth), some periodic (such as eclipse), and some 
occasional (such as thunder). Which ones are considered significant 
enough to be of special attention to the sciences, or even worthy of 
denotation by a single term, is to a certain extent a matter of 
convention. Put another way, events such as eclipses, blasts of 
thunder, and sheddings of leaves (or, for that matter, the potentialities 
for these) are not natural kinds, but are conjunctions of attributes 
whose inherence in certain natural kinds (the ‘simples’) is to be 
explained on the basis on the principles of the sciences.  
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So how exactly are the natures and consequences of such 
juxtapositions and events revealed through demonstration? When a 
nondefinitional attribute P is predicated of a simple subject S, this is 
because S is considered as standing in a complex relationship with 
other simple subjects (S1, S2, etc.) in such a way that there is 
predicated of S a conjunction of attributes, each of which is definitional 
of one of the subjects involved (for example, P, definitional of S, P1 of 
S2, and P3 of S3). A nominal definition identifies some predicate Q with 
the conjunction of subjects or attributes definitional of subjects (say P, 
P1 and P3). For example, if a nominal definition of thunder is ‘a certain 
noise in the clouds’, this is a conjunction of definitional primitives of 
acoustics, which defines noises as such, and meterology, which defines 
clouds (where I take it that this nominal definition leaves unstated the 
true subject of acoustics, air).39 There are three kinds of propositions 
that can serve as premises of a demonstration that S is Q. The 
premises can be definitional. Alternatively, a premise can identify one 
subject with another subject. For example, in the case of the 
demonstration that the moon suffers an eclipse, the moon, a subject 
of astronomy, is identified with an opaque body, a primitive of optics. 
Similarly, in the demonstration that certain plants shed their leaves, 
the leaves, a (part of) a primitive of botany, is identified with an 
earthy body, a primitive of physics.40 A third premise posits a kind of 
accidental juxtaposition whose occurrence is occasional. In this case, 
one subject is identified as located at or otherwise related to some 
other subject. For example, the demonstration that clouds 
(sometimes) thunder must rest on the premise that clouds are 
sometimes conjoined with fire.41 Accordingly, no terms will be present 
in the demonstration that is not either a subject term, a term 
definitional of some subject term; or a term which through a nominal 
definition denotes some conjunction of the above two kinds of terms. 
Any feature or predicate that results from the juxtaposition of two 
simple subjects must be analyzable as a conjunction of attributes that 
are definitional of the respective subjects. Were this not so, this new 
feature would be emergent as a whole greater than its parts, and this 
juxtaposition would itself have the role of being a simple subject.  
We see that on this understanding a derivative subject is not a 
thing unto itself, but is an attribute predicated of a basic subject, the 
attribute of standing in a certain relation to other subjects, a relation 
which necessarily entails certain other features and attributes of that 
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subject. Hence if one demonstrates that the simple subject stands in 
the complex relation to other subjects, it can be demonstrated that the 
features in question are likewise predicated of these subjects. 
Although ontologically speaking, there is a distinction between a 
relation, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the actions and 
attributes that necessarily follow from it, within Aristotle’s theory of 
demonstration, what McKirahan (1992) calls a derivative subject 
(whose existence is proven, not assumed) has precisely the same 
status as a demonstrated attribute (what Aristotle calls a kath’ hauto 
sumbebēkos). To prove the existence of a derivative subject is to show 
that a simple subject stands in certain relations to others. Likewise, 
demonstrating that a nondefinitional attribute holds of a simple subject 
requires the same thing: showing that the subject stands in certain 
relations to other simple subjects, which entail certain consequences 
identified as constituting the attribute in question. Because the ‘what it 
is’ is the ‘why it is’ (APo. 2.2 90a7-15) the attribute of being eclipsed is 
the interposition of the earth between the sun and moon; thunder is 
the situation in which fire, water, and clouds stand in the appropriate 
relation.  
We turn back to the second of Barnes’s objections against 
Pacius’s interpretation: that it would have been patently false for 
Aristotle to have maintained that the attributes of derivative, complex 
subjects are those of the simple subjects that make them up. The first 
step in answering this question is to become clear on what a complex 
subject is, and what role it has in Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. I 
take such a complex subject to be what I have been calling a 
juxtaposition of simple subjects, or a derivative subject. An attribute of 
a complex subject, then, would be an attribute of an attribute of a 
simple subject; and it is such attributes which, at some level, are to be 
identified with the attributes of the simple subject. Accordingly, in one 
sense the attribute of a complex subject falls under the genus that 
constitutes the subject of the science that studies the complex. But it 
does not stand to that subject in the relation of a species to its 
encompassing genus.42  
The second step is to become clear on what it means to say that 
an attribute of an attribute of a subject is itself an attribute of a 
subject. What is an attribute of an attribute? Aristotle’s ontology 
requires that an attribute of an attribute simply be an attribute with a 
specification; there is no room in the scheme of the categories for 
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adverbs as such.43 Thus brightness of color is simply color, further 
specified: bright color. To turn to examples familiar from Aristotle’s 
treatment of demonstration, the time or extent of the eclipse is 
properly speaking, an attribute of the body that is undergoing the 
eclipse. To say that the solar eclipse is total is not, properly speaking, 
to predicate totality to the eclipse, but to predicate a total eclipse of 
the sun. Accordingly, to demonstrate that a certain periodically 
occurring eclipse is total is not to predicate one attribute, totality of 
another attribute, being eclipsed. It is rather to predicate of the sun a 
single attribute, being totally eclipsed.44 Likewise, to predicate being 
right of a triangle is simple to predicate of one of its sides being at 
right angles to another side. Each of these attributes is, as we have 
seen, a conjunction of predicates that are definitional of simple 
subjects. Thus Aristotle tells us that being at right angles is definitional 
of a line (though Euclid takes right angles to themselves be simples 
whose definition and existence are assumed; see Elements, Book 1, 
Definition 10) and ‘the predicates belong in themselves to the simple 
alone, and to the other things on account of them’. (APo. 2.13 96b23-
25). That is to say, the attribute of a complex subject (that is, an 
attribute of a certain kind of attribute) is, in effect, a definitional 
attribute of a simple subject. It can be considered to be an attribute of 
a complex subject only by virtue of the definitional relation that the 
components of this attribute have to the simple subjects of the 
sciences. Aristotle says that this allows us to make sense of the fact 
that, even as so specified, these attributes are demonstrated on the 
basis of the definitions of the simple kinds that constitute the subject 
matter of the science. This is what Aristotle means when he says ‘the 
attributes of the complexes built from the atoms will be clear from the 
definitions’. (APo. 2.13 96b2)  
 
7. Conclusion  
I conclude with a rendering of 96b15-25 which supplies what 
Aristotle’s terse Greek leaves out, and presents the meaning of the 
passage as I understand it.  
When someone is dealing with the whole body of facts dealt 
with by a science, one must begin by dividing the genus into the 
infimae species. For example, in order to approach the task of working 
through the science of arithmetic as a whole, one must divide the 
genus number into the species triad and dyad, and then in this way 
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one must try to get a handle on the definitions of these two species. 
To take another example, in working through the science of geometry, 
one must try to get hold of the definitions of straight line, circle, and 
right angle. This whole process involves determining the category in 
which the subject genus falls, for example, whether it is a quantity or 
quality, since this category is going to need to enter into the definition 
of all of the species that fall under this genus. After this process is 
completed, one must study the demonstrated attributes by showing 
how they logically follow from the first principles which pertain to all 
items in the genus that the science studies. For the attributes of the 
subjects that are derivative from the infimae species, which are those 
predicates that are kath’ hauta sumbebēkota of the basic subjects, will 
be clarified (that is, their inherence in these subjects will be explained) 
on the basis of the definitions of those infimae species. This is true for 
two reasons: 1) the definition of the simple kinds is the first principle 
of all of the other facts with which that science is concerned, and 2) 
the attributes are kath’ hauta in relation only to the simple things (i.e. 
the infimae species); attributes are predicated of things that are not 
simple (that is, attributes or complex subjects) on account of those 
simple things, that is, from being deducible from the definitions of the 
simples.  
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1Thus Barnes (1994), p. 242, has written, ‘The section is exceedingly difficult: 
even its overall purpose is obscure’.  
2 Ross (1949), pp. 654, 657-659.  
3 See especially 1.7, 1.10 76a37-b5, 1.28.  
4 It is not clear what mode of being split or divided is denied of the atoms. 
Our examples of atoms are triad, dyad, straight line, circle, and right 
angle. Although the details are unclear, Aristotle identifies these as 
basic from the standpoint of the mathematical sciences, even though 
any particular dyad or line admits of spatial division. In regard to the 
why dyad and triad are principles of arithmetic, the science of number, 
it should be remarked that Aristotle is explicit that a unit is not a 
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number but the measure or number (Meta. N.1 1088a4-8). But two, 
unlike one, will fall under the genus of number, and only given another 
basic subject (three) can all other numbers be generated as complexes 
built on the simples. (Admittedly this is hard to reconcile with APo. 
1.10 76b3-5; Aristotle’s thoughts on the matter may not have been 
settled.) Likewise, the existence and nature of lines is basic in 
geometry (1.10 76b5); the line segments into which they can be 
divided are not more basic from a geometrical point of view.  
5 See Smyth (1956), 2869a:  often = namely, for example, and so where 
an antecedent statement is explained either by another word or by an 
example’.  
6 Barnes (1994), p. 243.  
7 Pacius (1966), pp. 334-335.  
8 See Mueller (1974), pp. 37-57.  
9 Barnes (1994), p. 243.  
10 On this see, for example, Ackrill (1978), pp. 71, 75; Furth (1988), pp. 11-
12.  
11 Not much hangs on what we take to be the referent of ‘this’  at 
96b19, since both possible referents (division into atoms and defining 
the atoms) are said to belong to the first stage of a science’s 
treatment of its subject matter, preceding the study of the attributes 
of these atoms.  
12 Ross (1949), p. 658.  
13 Barnes (1994), p. 243 argues that on this account the qualification of the 
axioms as ‘first’ is otiose, and that this calls this account into question. 
As an anonymous reviewer points out, Aristotle may have added 
 merely in order to remind the reader of the common principles 
of Book 1, since he had not mentioned them for some time.  
14 Waitz (1846), pp. 415-416; Barnes (1994), p. 243.  
15 Cf. 1.10 76a42-b2, where Aristotle states that an axiom is employed only 
insofar as it is applied to the kind in question. This could be 
understood as an indication that, because of the strictures of 
Aristotelian syllogistic, the subject of the axiom must be the kind 
under consideration, not any conjunction of kinds or all beings. 
However, it is not clear at all how axioms such as logical laws can be 
accommodated by the syllogistic. Principles such as the law of the 
excluded middle are not of the form S is P that Aristotelian syllogistic 
demands.  
16 Pacius (1966), pp. 334-335.  
17 Barnes (1994), p. 243  
18 Which definitions? Concievably Aristotle has in mind the definitions of the 
composites; Aristotle would be saying that even when a subject of an 
attribute is complex, the definition of that complex is the basis on 
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which that attribute is explained. But this does not allow us to make 
sense of what follows, Aristotle’s insistence that the simple is the 
principle of everything. Accordingly, all of the major interpretations of 
the passage (discussed below), different as they are, understand 
definitions as referring to the definitions of the simples.  
19 This latter sense is the sense in which such a kath’ hauto sumbebēkos is 
kath’ hauto. Although Aristotle uses this locution within the APo., it is 
not clear whether this sense is isolated and discussed as such in this 
work.  
20 See LSJ s.v. II. 5.  
21 See Ross (1949), p. 658.  
22 Philoponus (1909), pp. 400-403  
23 Themistius (1900), pp. 56-57. Themistius's paraphrase here is selective. 
While the other commentators are more explicit, one must infer 
Themistius's take concerning 2b, 3c and 4a on the basis of consistency 
with points which he explicity addresses.  
24 Eustratius (1907), pp. 191-98.  
25 Tricot (1979), pp. 215-216.  
26 Ross (1949), p. 657.  
27 Waitz (1846), pp. 415-416  
28 Ross (1949), p. 658.  
29 Detel (1993), Vol. 2, pp. 756-761. 
30 Barnes (1994), p. 244.  
31 The plural  and  at 96b21-
22 are not sufficient at evidence for taking the attributes of the 
composites to be derived from the attributes of all of the simples, 
since Aristotle is here speaking collectively of the relation holding 
between all the pathē and all of the simples.  
32 See for example, Plato, Theaetetus 147e-148b and Euclid, Elements Book 
7, Definitions 6-11.  
33 Note that the term for ‘prime’ is protos, the same term that is usually 
rendered ‘primary’, by which Aristotle, in the present passage, refers 
to the simple subjects of the sciences.  
34 Since McKirahan takes all demonstrations to be of this sort, he argues that 
all demonstrated attributes are definitional, and therefore argues that 
in addition to the form of definitions as genus + species, there is at 
work in APo. the notion of a ‘fat definition’ which is a conjunction of all 
definitional attributes. See McKirahan (1992), pp. 111, 119-120, 168-
169. But the notion of such ‘fat definitions’ is absent from the text.  
35 I use the term ‘juxtaposed’ for a number of different relations: that holding 
between two and three in making five, that holding among the lines of 
a triangle, that holding among astronomical bodies during an eclipse, 
and so on. I do not offer a single unifying formula for this relation, and 
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do not believe that Aristotle has a single variety of relation or 
concatenation in mind. In every case, though, there are simple 
subjects that stand in a relation to one another from which some 
attribute or event necessarily follows.  
36 See Goldin (1996), pp. 139-147.  
37 See Goldin (1996), pp. 58-61, 129-134.  
38 Again, understanding Aristotle’s mathematical examples as of the form S is 
P is more forced than Aristotle realizes. My interpretation is not alone 
in having problems reconciling Aristotle’s geometrical examples to the 
syllogistic demonstrative form in which he presents his analyses.  
39 Again, the logical details remain unclear. For thunder in this case we do not 
have a strict conjunction (for thunder is not a cloud that is also a 
noise) but is rather a conjunction of ‘noise’ and ‘in the clouds’. To show 
by means of Aristotelian syllogistic that there is such a thing as to 
instantiate this conjunction is not a straightforward affair. But again, 
the present passage seems to predate the application of syllogistic 
theory to Aristotle’s demonstrative theory, and the difficulty of such an 
application does not speak against the interpretation I here offer.  
40 On this see Goldin (1996), pp. 148-151.  
41 For a detailed discussion of how this and other demonstrations discussed 
here are accounted for in APo. 2.8, see Goldin (1996), pp. 101-137.  
42 As an anonymous referee for this journal puts it, ‘There are good reasons 
to suppose ... that the single genus with which a science is concerned 
“number” for arithmetic, “magnitude” for geometry) is not related to 
the things in it (individual numbers, perhaps, for arithmetic, straight 
lines, circles, etc. for geometry) in the way that a genus in the other 
sense, (“bird” for example) is related to the species that fall under it.  
43 See Goldin (2002), p. 244.  
44 In APo. 2.8 Aristotle sketches how it can be demonstrated that the moon 
has all of the sun’s light blocked from it, which attribute is the total 
eclipse.  
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